FORSKNING/STUDIE

THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE BALTIC SEA REGION AND CRISES:

Building Capacity for Transboundary Crisis Management

Findings from the Building Societal Security Research Group
Faktaruta

The European Union, the Baltic Sea Region and Crises – Building Capacity for Transboundary Crisis Management

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EU och Östersjöregionens organisationer har idag många verktyg för att hantera gränsöverskridande kriser såsom pandemier, miljökatastrofer och cyberattack. Denna rapport visar dock att Sverige och andra stater tvekar att använda dessa kapaciteter trots insikten att denna växande typ av kris inte kan hanteras av enskilda stater. I rapporten föreslås att Sverige bör ta initiativ till att skapa gemensamma platfrormar och övningar för nationella myndigheter och internationella organisationer kring Östersjön i syfte att stärka viljan att nytta förmågorna i praktiken.

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1. Introduction: Preparing for the New Normal

As we have to admit, this is a new reality; a new normal. And the current system has reached its limits – Christos Stylianides, European Commissioner of Humanitarian Affairs and Crisis Management

The security challenges that European states face – now and in the future – are daunting. Increased complexity of critical infrastructures, new forms of terrorism, climate change, rapid technological innovation, international power shifts, cyber-attacks, energy shortages and environmental degradation create new and unforeseen challenges. The resulting threats are increasingly large-scale, complex, and, importantly, transboundary in character. This new species of crisis – the transboundary crisis – is part of the ‘new normal’ for Western states.

National governments are poorly equipped to handle these challenges. Crises circumvent national borders, impact multiple policy sectors and defy conventional solutions. They may start as local incidents but quickly escalate to international crises. These transboundary crises are different from the normal “species of trouble” that periodically bedevil national administrations. In fact, they are so different that the institutionalized ways of preparation, and organizing a response, will not suffice. National states will have to initiate and facilitate transboundary cooperation. That will require different political-administrative arrangements, different types of preparation, different skills and competences.

Europe has experienced several transboundary crises in recent years: think of food scares (BSE, the “cucumber crisis”), migration flows, cyber-attacks (WannaCry), epidemics (H1N1, Ebola), financial and electricity breakdowns. New threats are emerging on the horizon, as technological advances bring new security challenges and foreign entities seek to erode our democratic institutions through disinformation campaigns, hacking and electoral interference.

This research project, entitled “The European Union, the Baltic Sea Region and Crises: Building Capacity for Transboundary Crisis Management” and funded by MSB offers practical guidance in preparing for transboundary threats and crises. Our research was organized around three broad questions:

1. **What type of collaboration?** What does transboundary crisis collaboration look like? How does it happen? Is there a role for the European Union (EU) in facilitating a transboundary crisis response?
2. **What are the costs of not collaborating? Of “non-Europe”?** Policymakers are used to mapping the costs of collaboration, which may appear excessive. But can we demonstrate how much failure to collaborate would cost us?
3. **How about regional collaboration?** Is it always necessary to engage the EU or other large International Organizations such as NATO or the World Health Organization? Or can we perhaps better work with regional organizations?

As we set out to answer these questions, we quickly learned that they all belong to one overarching question, which can be summarized as follows:

### 1.1 How can the nation state best prepare for transboundary crises?

In this report, we draw on our many findings to present a condensed answer to this important question. Along the way, we will refer to publications in which parts of the answer are treated in much more detail. We start with a brief explanation of the transboundary crisis and the challenges it poses to the nation state. We then describe the transboundary crisis management capacities that can be found in International Organizations at regional level (the EU) and macro regional level (including the Baltic Sea Region (the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Nordic Cooperation (the Haga-declaration), EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) and NATO). We ask whether and for what purpose a nation state like Sweden should work with one of these organizations to prepare for, or respond to, transboundary crises.

We can summarize our answer as follows:

- Sweden is poorly prepared to deal with transboundary crises (as are most states).
- International Organizations (e.g. EU and the Baltic Sea Region) harbor useful capacities that can facilitate a transboundary response.
- Crisis management organizations at the national level (e.g. MSB) are typically unaware of these capacities and are unlikely to call upon them.
- A new paradigm is needed to explain why transboundary collaboration is more or less effective, efficient and legitimate.
- National governments will have to invest in the fostering of a transboundary *security community* in which crisis professionals can forge transboundary response networks.
2. What is a transboundary crisis?

Transboundary crises and disasters result from threats that quickly cascade and impact critical, life-sustaining systems across sectoral, political and geographical borders. Our research for MSB confirms that transboundary crises have five essential characteristics.

First, they cross multiple boundaries separating countries, regions, policy sectors, and technical systems. These are compounded or multifaceted crises. The span of the transboundary crisis includes cities, regions, countries or even continents. There is no Ground Zero, not a particular policy sector, or one city that is in crisis. It impacts multiple domains of expertise. For instance, the transboundary crisis can cross from a financial system into an industrial system (the credit crunch putting US car makers under siege), from private to public (the BP oil spill), and from one sector of industry to another (a crisis in the car industry affects the steel industry). The financial crisis (2008) and pandemics (2003, 2005, 2009) are textbook examples of crises that do not respect national borders and wreak havoc across systems (cf. Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010).

Second, they escalate quickly after periods of quiet and invisible evolution. Many of the systems that sustain basic societal functions (e.g., energy grids, transport networks, food distribution, and financial flow structures) reach across European political borders. As a result, an incident in one corner of Europe can turn into a crisis for the entire continent: the Chernobyl explosion, the outbreak of mad cow disease, a power outage in Germany, irregular immigration in Southern Europe, a blocked oil pipe in the Ukraine, an ash cloud above Iceland, or a budget crisis in Greece – these are all instances of ‘local’ events that reached far beyond geographical and functional boundaries. The integration of Europe has made EU member states increasingly vulnerable to these transboundary crises (Missiroli, 2006; OECD, 2003; Rhinard, 2007).

Third, they are hard to understand. Crises that cross boundaries are difficult to understand as they emerge from systems with different logics and operating imperatives. A technical glitch may be well understood in one sector, only to surprise operators in another, connected sector. For instance, a natural gas problem somewhere in Europe may affect hospitals, first responders, and schools in another part. They are thus not single events, but rather a mixture of related events. Multiple effects appear on different time scales. An oil spill, for example,
may have immediate effects on shore birds and marine mammals, while effects on other marine life take longer to appear.

Fourth, they challenge lines of authority. Governmental crisis arrangements are all about defining ownership. It matters who is in charge, both for reasons of expediency and accountability. When a threat falls under the purview of multiple organizations or countries, the natural divergence of political interests, legal competences and professional norms will create tensions about ownership. A crisis is political in nature: scarce resources must be allocated quickly by a few officials. The stakes are high. The higher the number of powerful actors with a stake in the outcome, the higher the tension about who is calling the shots (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010).

Five, they defy conventional solutions. Every long-standing policy issue can be matched with a set of solutions. They may prompt controversy, but at least we have an idea what we are debating. That is rarely the case when a transboundary threat demands a solution. As the crisis is rooted in different systems and morphed over time, straightforward and comprehensible solutions do not exist. Different professional logics give rise to different ideas about the effectiveness and legitimacy of a response. A solution must be invented in real time, but the participants in that effort rarely understand that it is, at best, just a partial solution.

The upshot of these characteristics is that standing arrangements are unlikely to produce results. Traditional response capabilities at the national level, built to deal with more traditional threats (bound in space and time), no longer suffice. Transboundary crises require new ways of organizing to provide an effective and legitimate response.

One way to deal with these challenges is to cooperate across boundaries: international, cross-sectoral, interdisciplinary. International Organizations exist for this very purpose. National governments face two questions: Should we seek transboundary collaboration? If so, in which International Organization do we invest? These questions are politically fraught and not always easy to answer in the thick of crisis, without some sort of guiding framework. Before we offer a framework, we briefly discuss the potential capacities that can be found in international and macro regional organizations such as the Baltic Sea region. In this region, we find the EU, CBSS, EUSBSR, Nordic cooperation and NATO.
3. How can the EU help?

We spent much time mapping the capacities that exist within EU institutions that we think could enable and facilitate a transboundary response. We focused on capacities that would enhance the critical drivers of a joint response that is both effective and legitimate. We looked for capacities that can support detection, sense-making, meaning-making, coordination, decision-making, communication and accountability – the ingredients of successful crisis management.¹ We found that the EU has developed capabilities that are essential for building a response to transboundary crises, as we document below.

Few officials, even within the EU institutions, have a complete grasp of the full range of transboundary crises management capabilities under their roof. We had to search for those capacities in the Commission, Council Secretariat and selected agencies. We have reported these findings elsewhere (Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013; Boin, Rhinard and Ekengren, 2014; Rhinard and Backman, 2017). A few interesting insights are summarized here.

We uncovered, for instance, about forty horizon-scanning systems in different Directorates-General (DGs) of the European Commission, including RAS-BICHAT (to spot biological threats), EURDEP (to scan the environment for excessive radiology), Tariqa (to identify emerging conflicts in the EU neighbourhood), LISFLOOD (to monitor flood plains across Europe to anticipate disasters), and CIRAM (a risk analysis model used by Frontex to analyse data and spot outlying trends).

We also found many ‘early warning’ and ‘rapid alert’ systems that can communicate actual crises unfolding. These include the EWRS (for communicating disease outbreaks), the ADNS (for emerging animal health problems), ECURIE (for communicating ‘urgent’ information in the event of a nuclear emergency), and CSIRT (for notifying incidents of cyber-attacks). These systems link policy-specific authorities in each member state (and sometimes authorities outside of the EU) via a common platform and particular threat definitions. Some horizon scanning systems also include an early alert function, while some systems provide a ‘rapid response’ role as well. The EWRS, for instance, was used by member states to notify amongst themselves what measures were being taken during the acute phase of the H5N1 crisis; that information was then used to inform national decision-making and Union action, too. During the evacuation of Libya, national governments used the CoOL network (Consular On-Line Cooperation Network) to notify flight decisions into the zone of turmoil. Some member states requested air assistance from other member states via the network. These systems may thus facilitate policy coordination and operational activities via virtual networks.

¹ For an elaborate discussion of these pillars of successful crisis management, see Boin et al (2016). For a brief summary, see Boin, Kuipers and Overdijk (2013).
There are about **eight crisis rooms**, ranging from DG Home’s STAR (Strategic Analysis and Response Centre), DG Echo’s ERCC (European Response Coordination Centre), the EEAS’s Situation Room, the External Action Service’s MSSC (Maritime Support Service Centre), DG Santé’s HEOF (Health Emergency Operations Facility), Frontex’s Situation Centre, the ECDC’s Epidemic Intelligence Unit, and Europol’s E3C (European Cybercrime Centre). These centres are tasked with consolidating pertinent information, drawing up digestible reports for policymakers, and coordinating with counterparts in national capitals, Brussels, and, in some cases, in other International Organizations. They range from rooms that are barely used (STAR) to centres that have 3 identical rooms, for handling simultaneous crises, and are staffed 24 hours a day/7 days a week (ERCC).

Most DGs (especially those which have experienced crises in the past) have procedures for crisis-oriented decision-making. The list includes DG Transport, DG Energy, DG Santé, DG Agriculture, and DG Home. Procedures vary, but generally stipulate the steps to be taken in the event of an unexpected, urgent event that requires the DG to respond quickly. This response may include close monitoring of a situation, in the event it implicates European infrastructures (as for DG Transport during the Ash Cloud incident), or it may include taking critical decisions (as for DG Agriculture’s quarantine decisions during foot-and-mouth disease).

In 2005, the Dutch Presidency initiated an EU-wide set of **crisis decision procedures**, stretching across the DGs, EU institutions, and agencies. The procedures were called the ‘CCA’ (Crisis Coordination Arrangements). The CCA had a set of procedures requiring heads of PermReps to assemble in Brussels (within a 2-hour time-frame), to hear integrated assessments constructed by officials from different institutions, and to take operative decisions on behalf of their member states when required (Olsson, 2009). The complex arrangements included a crisis support team of experts to advise officials, who in turn consulted the political level.

The CCA was renamed the IPCR (Integrated Political Crisis Response) arrangements in 2013. The IPCR is exercised on a regular basis. The scenario-based exercises have involved a fictitious cruise ship hijacking of national politicians (2006), severe weather destroying European energy hubs on the Mediterranean coast (2008) and a cyber ‘event’ paralyzing multiple EU government infrastructures. The most extensive exercise was EDREX (2016-2017) that included a natural disaster in the EU’s neighbourhood and its cross-border consequences and involved nearly 1,000 national officials in the EU institutions and member states.

Some of the capabilities are merely potential and have never been used in a real crisis (even if the migration crisis has helped to road-test quite a few). But most are not “theoretical” capacities; they have been engaged in recent crises, some of which that shook the Union to the core. We may certainly question the effectiveness of these instruments in the light of these crises and the backlash that these crises caused in various member states (Ekengren and Hollis, 2017). But these are the capacities that are available. The most striking observation, then, is the persistent and deep-running hesitation in many member state capitals to invest in these capacities and to use them before and during transboundary crises.
We have noted elsewhere that much remains to be done. The EU’s many capabilities for transboundary crises weren’t all built with transboundary crisis management in mind. Capabilities exist in different corners of the EU institutions and in the Commission itself, but they are not interlinked or coordinated. The EU’s impressive ‘early warning’ capabilities, for example, do not communicate with one another. Any attempt to act and make transboundary crisis preparedness a political priority is hamstrung by a lack of awareness and fragmented authority. Member states do not always see the benefit of prioritizing what is a rather vague, ‘low-likelihood’ challenge, even if we may someday look back in dismay that we missed the next big thing.

\- See our overview of publications at the end of this report.
4. How can organizations in the Baltic Sea Region help?

We also mapped macro regional capacities for transboundary crisis management (Barzanje, Ekengren, Rhinard, 2018). In the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) we found prevention efforts, preparation guidelines, response assistance, and recovery plans within the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Nordic Cooperation (the Haga-declaration), and NATO.

The EUSBSR is mainly directed towards preventive capacities and the improvement of risk assessment capabilities and crisis management cooperation. To this end, much effort is invested in encouraging knowledge transfer and information-sharing and developing joint procedures and standards for harmonising data and knowledge-sharing systems.

Within the EUSBSR civil protection and crisis management are addressed under the “Priority Areas” Secure and Safe. Priority Area Secure addresses all sorts of threats regardless whether their origin is natural or man-made disaster. PA Safe focuses on maritime safety and security. The EUSBSR’s so-called flagships include projects that develop scenarios and identify gaps for all hazards (“from gaps to caps”) and macro-regional capacities for risk assessment and crisis management schemes (BRISK).

The EUSBSR also runs projects together with CBSS and HELCOM (Helsinki Commission) on the sub-regional risk of spill of oil and hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea. The project Baltprevresilience improves data-collection, sharing, and analysis of impact and response at the local level to prevent multiple everyday accidents and reduce their impacts. EUSBSR has together with CBSS developed the HAZARD project, which brings rescue agencies, relevant authorities, logistics operators of the Baltic Sea Region together in risk analysis and the improvement of communication and operational capabilities in emergencies. Another EUSBSR project is the Baltic Leadership Programme in Civil Protection coordinated by the Swedish Institute, the Swedish Contingencies Agency and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. The programme aims to strengthen regional cooperation by creating a network of civil protection actors and equip them with necessary tools and knowledge to manage cross-border cooperation and strengthening the ties between crisis management agencies.

The CBSS strategy for the Baltic Sea Region – “Safe and Secure regions” – builds capacity in the region for joint response to emergencies. The CBSS accommodates

3 For more information of the EUSBSR and the PA Secure and PA Safe, see https://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu.
4 The CBSS strategy in BSR is mainly based on the EUSBSR; Russia provides a complementary strategy; and the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
the CBSS Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (EGNRS), the Civil Protection Network (CPN) for national rescue and crisis management authorities and the Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC), a partnership addressing security-related border control issues in the BSR for simplifying border control procedures.

**NATO** pushes for enhancing information-sharing and harmonisation among its member states. But whereas the EU’s main efforts are aimed at prevention, the Alliance’s main objective is to prepare its member states and partners to cope with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict. NATO’s coordination of operative responses enhances the resilience capacity of member states to resist “armed attack.” While these activities clearly can be argued to bring added-value in the form of civil protection, the main consideration is to ensure preparedness of the civilian society and population to assist the military and make civil resources accessible to the military.

The main NATO arrangements for civil protection fall under NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning (CEP), including civilian and military strategy, planning, and activity. The CEP involves a range of aspects concerning crisis management in the sphere of civil protection. The main objective of the CEP, however, is to protect civilian populations against the consequences of war, terrorist attack and other major incidents or natural disasters. As part of an overall NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP), the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), NATO’s Operational Planning System (NOPS) and NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM) are designed to complement and support NATO’s crisis management role and response capability. In responding to requests in cases of emergency, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU), comprising both civil and military elements; medical units, equipment and materials; as well as assets and transport, stands ready to be activated with the aid of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) countries (i.e. NATO member and partner states). In response to aggression emanating from Russia, NATO has adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). Even if the RAP primarily is a military mechanism facilitating readiness to reassure NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States, there are mechanisms for reinforcing crisis management. The Plan brought about the establishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which stands ready to rapidly respond to any threats and help manage crises, peace support operations, and disaster relief.5 In addition, NATO has started to develop systems

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Reduction in the BSR guides other projects, hence different projects are driven by different objectives. For more information, see [http://www.cbss.org/strategies/](http://www.cbss.org/strategies/).

5 For more information on the RAP, see [https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohg/topics_119353.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohg/topics_119353.htm), and for the establishment of the VJTF, see [https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-force--very-high-readiness-joint-task-force](https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-force--very-high-readiness-joint-task-force).
The strength of Nordic cooperation lies in its preparedness and response capacities, including regular meetings of officials and responsible ministers for rescue services and preparedness. The Nordic countries train regularly and have experience with responding to emergencies and crisis. In 2009, a framework agreement for civil protection – the Haga declaration - was adopted. A series of frameworks and agreements in the spheres of health care provision, rescue services and fire prevention have promoted joint Nordic capacities to reinforce public safety, contingency planning and mutual assistance in the event of accident or disaster. The important Nordic rescue services cooperation is known as NORDRED. In the area of health care, the Nordic Public Health Preparedness Agreement (NORDHELS) brings together the health and medical authorities in the Nordic countries.

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6 In order to enhance data-sharing has NATO undergone an intelligence structure reform promoting increased interaction between members of the EAPC, and in addition, has NATO started to develop systems and mechanics for information gathering, risk assessment and information disseminating. For more information on this development, see “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, November 19-20 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf

7 For more information on the development of Nordic cooperation, see http://www.norden.org/en/fakta-om-norden-1/the-history-of-the-nordic-region-1.
5. Strategic choices: What type of collaboration for the next transboundary crisis?

Consider the following scenario:

January 2019. Finally a real winter. Polar air has reached deep into Europe, creating problems everywhere. The news about weather-related problems is suddenly punctuated by reports about a nuclear crisis on the borders of Europe. A nuclear power plant in Belarus is releasing radio-active plumes that reach into Poland and Hungary. Or at least that is what the readings of some specialized institutes suggest. Belarus denies that there is a problem. The Prime Minister dismisses the reports as “fake news.” At the same time, a large group of people have crossed the border into Lithuania, reaching the port of Klaipėda. A ship of “nuclear refugees” arrives on the shores of Gotland (Sweden). The group consists of mostly men. Reports circulating on social media suggest that Belarus emptied its jails and sent criminals across the border. Other reports suggest that the measurements of the specialized institutes are false. Their systems have been hacked and the readings of radio-active fallout falsified.

A country or policy system that becomes entangled in this type of crisis will soon learn that cross-border collaboration is needed to get anything done. The challenges will range from detecting the crisis to understanding its dynamics and impacts; from deciding on response actions to informing the general public in a sea of disinformation. These challenges are not easy to meet in the best of circumstances; they will quickly sink an organization or country that is not prepared to collaborate across borders.

This realization prompts two questions. The immediate question is how to organize a joint response? Should a country rely on ad hoc arrangements or make use of arrangements offered by International Organizations such as the European Union, NATO, the World Health Organization or the World Bank? Or perhaps they should engage with a macro regional organization such as the CBSS or the Benelux? The long-term question asks whether it would be wise to invest in a security community that can prepare transboundary responses. These are the questions that should engage national governments that realize the threat environment is changing.

These questions are not easy to answer. Seeking international cooperation in case of a crisis threat touches upon raisons d’État and thus falls within the domain of “high politics”. Even seemingly minor or technical requests for international cooperation – a few tents, a fire-fighting airplane – have the potential to become highly politicized. Why involve the seemingly dysfunctional bureaucracy of an International Organization when the lives of citizens are at stake?
Our research leads us to recognize an uncomfortable paradox: the rapid development and institutionalization of international crisis management capacities has not led to a convincing performance in recent crises. Moreover, we see persistent hesitation among member states to invest in and call upon these instruments. This evokes the question how member states arrive at strategic positions that to a large degree may determine whether Europe can quickly initiate an effective and legitimate response to a transboundary threat.

Before we address this question, let’s first consider the critical question that precedes all other questions on international collaboration.
6. Optimizing Cooperation

There are plenty of tools, arrangements, mechanisms and venues that an International Organization such as the EU has readily available. Member states just have to decide to use them. Easy as it sounds, transboundary collaboration virtually always appears a painful and often failing proposition. In our project, we spent quite a bit of time figuring out why this is the case.

To understand why countries do or do not seek to collaborate in times of crisis, we made extensive use of what is known as “collective action theory” (Blondin, Boin and Ekengren, 2017; Rhinard, 2017). This body of literature explains well why countries are unlikely to collaborate. To be fair, we should note that this school of thought has mostly focused on complex problems with non-crisis characteristics. The overall finding is that even when it may seem in the best interest of a country to seek collaboration, most countries are unlikely to do so. The literature names many reasons. The most important ones seem to be:

- Nations will only collaborate if the benefits outweigh the costs of collaboration. It is rarely clear that the benefits will be high enough.
- Nations will not collaborate if they can receive the benefits of a joint response without having to invest in that collaboration. Free riding is tempting.
- Nations will be hesitant to collaborate if there is no clear solution in sight that can anchor the collaboration.

But even if countries seek to collaborate (all interests have magically aligned), enforcement mechanisms are needed to keep nations in line, or so the argument goes. Here we run into a core problem that political scientists always recognize: there are no international enforcement mechanisms that nation states have to recognize and follow. In the end, collaboration is spurious and fickle, the theorists predict.

It is easy to see how a crisis poses even harder conditions for international collaboration to emerge (even if that collaboration is more urgently required). After all, it is never clear whether benefits will emerge from collaboration, whether the fruits of joint action cannot be enjoyed without actual collaboration, or whether a solution exists in the first place (we argued that “no solution” is a characteristic of transboundary crises). No enforcement arrangements exist to keep nation states in line (the Solidarity Clause is a case in point: formulated as a requirement, but without legal teeth).

The literature thus suggests collaboration, urgent or long-term, is unlikely to just happen. We know that the EU has built many tools that add up to a security community. But we also know that when a crisis materializes, the security
community does not always act as such. This brings us to the next question: what can be done to enhance the prospect of transboundary crisis collaboration?

The literature explains non-collaboration as a resultant of diverging interests. Research findings suggest that if all countries would agree that it is in their best interest to collaborate before or during a crisis, joint action would be much more likely. The crisis literature, on the other hand, helpfully observes that crises are deeply political in nature. This means that the “national interest” becomes subject of intense politicization during a crisis. What is good for a country becomes the subject of emotional and not always rational discussion in the political arena of that country.

As multiple values are in play, it is not easy to assess initiatives for joint collaboration. We prepared a method to **clarify the potential benefits of joint action**. This method does not do away with or negate political controversy. It merely canalizes the discussion. It sets the playing field, so intense discussions may lead to insights about possible benefits.

We recognize three ways to assess whether international collaboration is useful in the face of a transboundary crisis. The three approaches are each built around a core value:

- **efficiency**
- **effectiveness**
- **legitimacy**

### 6.1 Solution 1: Making Cooperation Efficient

A question asked sooner or later always is: *will collaboration lead to a more cost-effective way to achieve our goals? Are the costs of collaboration defensible? Are they in line with expected benefits?*

For each proposal to collaborate, three types of questions should be entertained. First, in what time perspective should the assessment of possible reduction of costs be made? Collaboration may come with high initial costs but they may generate valuable benefits in the long run. The questions policy makers can ask here:

- Would this proposal save us money in the short term?
- Would this proposal save us money in the long term?
- Will it create *indirect* ways to save money in the long or short term?
- Can we measure how much money it would save?

Second, the collective action literature instructs us to establish who must carry the costs and who will enjoy the benefits. Would it reduce costs for a country, other countries, or the International Organization(s) facilitating the joint response?
We formulated frameworks and questions that would help us to measure the financial costs and benefits of international collaboration. More specifically, we elaborated methodological approaches for assessing the costs and benefits of EU cooperation in transboundary crisis management.

The benefits of EU cooperation were calculated in terms of the difference between the aggregated cost for the EU’s 28 member states when they do not cooperate in transboundary crisis and the aggregated cost when they do cooperate (Andrén, Boin, Ekengren 2018). We applied this approach to two crisis cases: the refugee crisis (2015-17) and the ash cloud crisis (2010). In the former crisis, we measured the financial losses of non-cooperation that EU member states suffered as a consequence of not following through on already decided common policies such as the quota system for the resettlement of refugees in the member states. Our investigations indicated that the aggregated European cost of housing refugees would have been higher in the short term but probably lower in the long run if the EU’s member states had cooperated and implemented the EU’s decisions (which they did not do).

On the ground of our study of the Ash cloud crisis, we developed yet another method by examining to what extent the aggregated European losses would have been lower had the crisis in 2010 been managed with the EU capacities existing in 2017. In this case the benefits of cooperation were clearer than in the refugee crisis. The aggregated costs in 2010 would have been considerably lower had the 2017 capacities been in place at the time of the crisis.

We found that calculating the costs of non-cooperation (the cost of ‘non Europe’) is no easy task. There are many constraints that make counterfactual analyses difficult to perform and potentially controversial. However, we also concluded that this effort would lead to a more informed decision-making process and clearer answers to the question for whom a certain proposal or capacity would reduce the cost: the EU as a whole or the individual EU member state. Through careful counterfactual analysis, one is able to consider otherwise invisible costs (which only become visible if you ask: what does it cost us when we do not cooperate?). But more work needs to be done to tally up the costs and benefits of international collaboration.

Our methods for measuring the costs and benefits of EU cooperation can help policymakers save money. In addition to asking how much EU cooperation costs, we propose an approach that helps to consider the costs of not cooperating in the face of a transboundary crisis. What is needed is a validated way of calculating the costs of ‘non-Europe.’
6.2 Solution 2: Making Cooperation Effective

The key question here is: will joint action help us achieve our goals? Unfortunately, it is not always clear what, exactly, the goals of a country are. This is certainly true for crisis. It may therefore not be easy to establish if collaboration will enhance goal achievement. Under normal circumstances, it is hard enough to establish beyond the shadow of a doubt which policy works and which policy fails. It is near impossible to establish this type of causality for crisis management (let alone transboundary crisis management).

The goals of crisis and disaster management organizations are often ambitious and non-controversial (‘save the people’, ‘protect society’), but it is rarely clear how these goals can be achieved. The limited number of crisis and disaster events we have experienced makes it impossible to create simple assessment metrics through which to assess how a new initiative will make a crisis organization more (or less) effective.

Based on our research, we identify several dimensions of crisis management (understood here in the broadest sense) that may help to reason through if joint action can and will make a difference.

1. Prepare first responders through training and exercise

Whether it is through facilitation or funding, most crisis organizations seek to enhance the quality of first responders. In a disaster, first responders can make a life-or-death difference. It is therefore critical that they know what to do (and with whom), are capable of performing their task, and helping others perform their task. To this effect, crisis agencies develop training curricula, organize exercises, and assess incidents to learn lessons (which are then fed back into training).

- The question policymakers can ask here: does collaboration contribute to national efforts to prepare and train first responders?

2. Organize and move needed resources to impacted areas

The response to a crisis or disaster usually requires the organization and movement of resources (food, water, energy, expertise, transportation etc.). This may include the movement of resources to areas abroad. An effective response requires a complex mixture of pre-positioning, contracting, alerting, mobilization and logistics. The organization of this mixture typically reaches across organizational and geographic boundaries. It is a goal that few will disagree with, but it is also a goal that few people know how to do right.

- The question policymakers can ask here: does joint action help to quickly mobilize and allocate critical resources in times of crisis?

3. Preparing strategic decision-makers to lead

In times of crisis, people look at their leaders for guidance. While the role of political leaders may be over-estimated, it is clear that their performance can undermine or
boost the effectiveness of the response. More specific, there is a set of tasks that if performed well at the strategic level will benefit the perceived effectiveness of the response. These tasks include:

- **Making sense of the evolving situation**: critical information needs to be collected, analyzed, and shared in order to arrive at a common operational picture of the situation.
- **Making critical decisions**: leaders must decide on strategic issues. It is imperative that leaders understand their obligations to decide and the boundaries to their decisional authority.
- **Coordinating a multi-actor response**: leaders need to facilitate cooperation between actors that may have never worked together before. This requires a combination of selective intervention and guiding leadership.
- **Crisis communication**: it is critical that crisis managers ‘speak with one mouth’ and reach the targeted population with their message. This requires seamless cooperation between political advisors, communication experts and communication networks.

- In considering joint action, policymakers can ask this question: does collaboration help to facilitate at least one of the strategic crisis management tasks (without hurting any of the other tasks)?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Transboundary crisis management can be made more effective by strengthening the support staff of those in charge. Transboundary crisis collaboration should be defined in terms of critical tasks. Effectiveness is enhanced when staff is trained to facilitate the execution of these tasks.</th>
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### 6.3 Solution 3: Making Cooperation Legitimate

We have already noted that crises are deeply political by nature. So are the responses to a crisis. Once the response becomes transboundary, meaning that more actors become involved and will have a say in shaping the response, the politics of crisis management take a turn down a treacherous road. The idea that the response to a crisis is influenced -- if not determined by -- “outside forces” tends to erode support for national leaders and institutions. If it is not explained well, international collaboration can backfire in unforeseen ways. Politicians are all too aware of this risk, which explains their hesitation to jump into international response operations that affect their own nation.

For instance, the financial crisis laid bare deep divisions among Eurozone governments. The migration crisis caused outright paralysis. It appears that international collaboration was not always perceived as effective in these transboundary crises.

In fact, it appears that in some member states the EU is viewed as the source of transboundary crises. This has given rise to “backsliding” – a retreat from legal commitments to the values that underlie the European Union. It has also created
dangerous vulnerabilities in the EU’s response preparedness. It has certainly undermined the prospects for a rapid joint response to a transboundary threat.

This prompts the first question:

- Is international collaboration critically important for the protection of nation? Is it really necessary? Can the reasons for transboundary collaboration be explained to the general public?

But there is a second, deeper question that pertains to the long-term investment in a security community. Building such a community is a normative project, binding like-minded states with common values. A consistent show of commitment is critical to the smooth functioning of a security community. Foot-dragging and reluctance to cooperate in ‘peace-time’ have negative implications when cooperation is needed during a crisis (Mearsheimer 2014). Regular, ongoing support from all partners has an important ‘signaling’ effect that improves coordination (Sebenius 1992).

Collective action theory reminds us that different kinds of public goods (e.g. resilient critical infrastructures) require different production methods. Some can be produced by one, powerful state. Others must be produced by every state contributing its fair share. If some states refuse to participate, the overall project falls apart (Barrett 2007). Pandemic surveillance and control is one such example: if one state resists active cooperation, the larger group fails as a result.

A state’s identity matters, too. For instance, for a country like Sweden, international engagement is a core value held highly by the political system. Sweden prides itself in usually sending the most troops (per capita) on international missions, in promoting the United Nations as the main platform for resolving international conflicts, and in trying to take the lead in countless environmental treaty efforts (Miles 2000). In the EU, Sweden is seen, generally and perhaps only stereotypically, as a ‘good partner’ (Stromvik 2006).

From this angle, an important question worth asking is:

- If a country does not collaborate, will that damage its reputation as a faithful member of the international security community?

International collaboration is a political issue. It is not just the resultant of considerations about potential effectiveness or cost savings. It is also a matter of political expediency. Building a security community, emphasizing similar values, may enhance the prospects of transboundary collaboration.

6.4 An encompassing solution: Building security communities for a new era

We conclude that the new realm of transboundary threats requires a new type of security community, one that is transboundary in nature and is based on promoting
functional crisis management capacities. This entails a conscious effort to escape the constraints of high politics that so often emerge when nation states consider urgent collaboration in the face of a crisis. The idea is to promote international collaboration through creating transnational communities of practice in areas such as civil protection and humanitarian aid (Ekengren 2018a). If practitioners – including academics and experts in private companies – can build institutions around shared practices, joint discoveries of what works in practice (in terms of the criteria outlined above), a community of security professionals can emerge. This community can become the fertile ground for new initiatives, joint expertise and transboundary collaboration.

Karl Deutsch famously defined a security community as a group of people integrated to the point that there is a ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways’ (Deutsch 1957: 6). The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea region (EUSBSR) tries to accomplish exactly this. It also has the potential to foster a security community for a new era of transboundary threats by nurturing a community of civil protection practitioners. As we have shown, the EU as a whole has also taken on the characteristics of this new kind of security community.

Magnus Ekengren (2018b) sees much potential in this approach. He argues that a more pronounced bottom-up, long-term, and macro-regional approach can turn the foreign policies of the states around the Baltic Sea into low politics. This approach would build on concrete joint problem-solving projects and people-to-people contacts, and avoid restrictions on participants of the north-west regions of Russia. Such an approach would require substantial investment of nation states, which, to begin with, would require widespread agreement on the analysis and the proposed solution. That seems difficult, given the current geopolitical condition but should through a strong focus on joint ‘technical’ problem solving in fields such as environmental and civil protection be pursued as a long term objective in the region.

A security community can only exist and function if its members “choose to act as if there is a community” (Ekengren and Hollis, 2017 p. 11). The underlying assumption of this alternative approach (“practice theory”) is that communities don’t develop because policymakers say they (must) exist. They evolve and they exist in spite of what policymakers say or do. They emerge from common searches for joint solutions in reaction to real problems. The key people here are the inhabitants of a transnational world consisting of diplomats, security advisors and representatives of International Organizations.

In this approach, collective action emerges from the bottom-up, from the problem arena. Those who are “working the problem” collectively consider:

a. Whether joint capacities work (have they worked in the past? Do they work now?).
b. Whether joint capacities can be rapidly improved and adapted towards the problem at hand.

This perspective suggests that the establishment of a joint response is a trial-and-error process that is best left to committed professionals. Joint action should be removed from the arena of high politics, one might argue in this vein.

Is this realistic? In our research, we did find that many if not most of the EU’s crisis management capacities grew out of small initiatives that were never intended to blossom into the tools that they eventually became. So there is certainly evidence that such an approach gives rise to useful capacities that further transboundary collaboration.

Is it a feasible strategy in the face of transboundary crises? These processes are gradual, punctuated by sudden escalations. While capacities may emerge, the question is if we can afford to await the outcome of evolutionary processes. They also produce many irrelevant or useless outcomes. There is no direction to the process. The practice approach also lacks a strategic, cross-sectoral dimension to the building of transboundary capacities.

On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that the political level could create transboundary capacities without building on the driving forces vested in the established operative practices of first responders and the transboundary contacts and routines that are evolving among national officials on the ground.

Our research suggests an urgent need to improve regular contact between national crisis managers and relevant EU and macro regional organizations by developing existing networks especially in terms of links to the private sector and academic experts, and between the operational and political levels.
7. Conclusion: The ball’s in the national court

Our research has found little evidence to suggest that the nation state stands ready to deal with the prospect of transboundary crises. National governments find it hard enough to deal with traditional threats. Traditional bureaucratic arrangements to deal with crises are typically designed with geographic or system boundaries in mind. These arrangements are not suited for transboundary crises. Our attention must therefore shift to consider the “added value” of international cooperation. It is helpful to develop an approach that clarifies the why and how of international cooperation.

Our research confirms that International Organizations such as the EU have built considerable capacities over time that may facilitate crisis cooperation between member states. There is also a lot of civil protection cooperation going on in the Baltic Sea area. International Organizations, including the EUSBSR, NATO, and CBSS, offer crisis management capacities that can facilitate collaboration between nations, regions and sectors. The array of capacities is impressive.

But there is an intriguing paradox in all this: despite all the investments in international crisis management capacities and the rise of transboundary threats, member states remain hesitant to make use of these capacities. The result is major time and resources invested to cooperation, but little to show for it.

The solution to this conundrum lies with the nation state: it must learn to deliberate about questions that touch upon its raison d’être: identifying International Organizations that best fit the various types of transboundary crises that will likely emerge in the not-so-far future. What is missing is guidance to assess comparative advantages of this or that organization, or establish a division of labor between International Organizations to avoid costly overlap and duplication.

We need transboundary institutions that can guide this process. In collective action terms, we need to invest in institutions that overcome cooperation problems. These institutions should be rooted in the development of long-term transnational security and crisis management communities of practice. How to invest smartly in the building of these security communities? Five ways forward can illuminate the way.

1. Nation-states should invest in EU and macro regional organs, capacities and exercises that promote inter-organizational and first responders’ contacts
and transboundary crisis management routines and procedures for the division of labor in crisis. Joint crisis management platforms/centers for the Baltic Sea region should be set up for contacts between EUSBSR, CBSS, Nordic organs and NATO modelled on the EU’s Emergency Response and Coordination Center (ERCC) in Brussels bringing together EU, UN and NATO officials.

2. The crisis management arrangements of the EU and macro regional organizations should largely be driven by incremental, bottom-up practices, rather than top-down strategies. This calls for a shift in the approach to reform: from the traditional belief in grand strategies directed by central government to the fostering of a culture facilitating EU and macro regional institutions’ experimentation for incremental progress.

3. The EU and macro regional organizations need to establish arrangements that can overcome the strong parallel and conflicting nature of various routines rooted in transnational practices (diplomacy, humanitarian aid, crisis management), and facilitate the progressive development of efficient *modus operandi* between these practices, which, in practice, are often developed on the field. Joint coordination centers (see point 1) hosting representatives of different transnational communities should be established not only for the acute crisis phase, but also for the building of an institutional memory, to strengthen the progressive and joint learning of these communities.

4. The EU and macro regional organizations should provide skillful policy entrepreneurs room for maneuvering, enabling them to experiment and expand successful transnational practice. The EU gave High Representative Javier Solana room to build an institutional infrastructure for civil-military operations in the early days of the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy. It is precisely this sort of political-administrative experimentation that can create innovations in transboundary collaboration.

5. In the same spirit of experimentation, the EU and macro regional organizations should allow for failures. The decision-making structures, institutions and resources should be arranged in such a way as to encourage entrepreneurs and strategic innovative acts. Furthermore, the organizations should be forgiving, allowing these entrepreneurs and these strategic acts second chances when they fail to establish a new transnational practice.
8. References


Project Research Papers


**Background Reading**


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