

REPORT

Building resilience for the future

Lessons from Ukraine



Building resilience for the future – lessons from Ukraine

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Order No: MSB2240 – September 2023

ISBN: 978-91-7927-424-5

Preface

Ukraine's continuing ability to stand up against Russia's illegal invasion starting in 2014 highlights the importance of ensuring whole-of-society resilience. Societal resilience is at the core of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's (MSB) mission. This involves working closely with a wide range of public and private stakeholders in different sectors and at different levels in Sweden, Europe and around the world. In an increasingly connected world, real, meaningful resilience at home requires engagement both locally and globally; MSB's approach reflects this.

The Ukrainian people's continued opposition to Russia's aggression is an inspiration to us all. Europe has much to learn from Ukraine's experiences in facing down and holding off a much larger enemy. Indeed, by looking at these experiences, we can draw many lessons, including ones that can help us strengthen both overall European resilience and Sweden's civil defence in particular.

In order to capture these lessons, MSB arranged in April 2023 several seminars aimed at promoting a discussion on societal resilience in the context of Russia's war against Ukraine. The outcome of the seminars were then fed into a larger high-level conference, which was organised together with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs on 4 May 2023.

This report provides a summary of some of the key take-aways from these very fruitful events, which I hope will be of value to many different stakeholders both within Sweden, in Europe and globally. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Ukrainian representatives that were able to find the time to share their invaluable experiences and perspectives.

Stockholm, 2023-09-25



Charlotte Petri Gornitzka Director-General

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Introduction

Introduction

Well over one and a half years have passed since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and more than nine years since the illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Ukrainian Donbas.


During the spring of 2023, MSB arranged four thematic seminars which gathered experts from different sectors. The seminars focused on specific areas within civil defence, namely the role of civil society, public-private cooperation, cyber-security, and emergency services and the protection of civilians. The events were followed by the high-level conference "Forum Ukraine: Building resilience for the future", which was organised on 4 May in Stockholm. During the conference, MSB welcomed distinguished speakers from Ukraine, different EU Institutions and Sweden. These included, for instance, Olha Stefanishyna, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Janez Lenarčič, European Commissioner for Crisis Management, Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Swedish Minister for Civil Defence, and Jessika Roswall, Swedish Minister for EU Affairs. A full list of speakers can be found in the appendix.

The conference gathered around 150 participants and highlighted a number of important lessons concerning resilience and civil defence within the context of the war in Ukraine, including the role of crisis leadership and strategic communication in building up the public's willingness to resist in the face of disinformation campaigns and other information challenges. The conference also addressed the role of the private sector and its adaptability in times of war, the importance of ensuring cybersecurity, and strategies for maintaining the continuity of vital societal functions in even the most trying circumstances.

In this report, key findings and reflections from the various events that were organised during the spring of 2023 are presented. In some cases, these findings are complemented by insights from other sources.

Limitations

Identifying key lessons in the middle of an active war is not an easy task for many reasons, not least because of the limited availability of reliable, verified information. What is considered to be a "key conclusion" at the time of writing might look very different with the passage of time, further developments, and the availability of new information. The findings in this report reflect the state of affairs during the first half of 2023.



Summary and key findings

What can we learn to strengthen resilience and civil defence?

Since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, starting in 2014, Ukraine has demonstrated its ability to maintain the continuity of vital societal functions, such as the provision of food, water, electricity, telecommunications and transportation, in the midst of a full-blown war. Meanwhile, the population has helped to protect the country from cyberattacks and propaganda campaigns, and voluntary organisations, companies and local communities have made significant contributions to the country's capacity to defend Ukraine from the Russian aggression.

The Ukrainian defence effort has in other words clearly demonstrated the value of a "whole-of-society" approach to resilience.

From the various events organized by the MSB during the spring of 2023, six lessons stand out:

- 1. Strategic communications a key capability
- 2. Achieving a willingness to defend unleashing the power of individuals and civil society
- 3. Investing in cyber security from individual awareness to international cooperation
- 4. Involving the private sector in solving problems innovation, adaptation, and flexibility
- 5. Emergency and rescue services a valuable asset with a high symbolic value
- 6. Culture fosters resilience and unity safeguarding cultural heritage and social infrastructure



1. Strategic communications

A key capability

Throughout the war, Ukraine has been targeted by Russian disinformation. Strategic communication has proven to be an integral part of the Ukrainian defence. It has served many purposes, including maintaining a willingness within the Ukrainian population to defend their country, rallying continued support from the international community, and neutralising Russian information warfare efforts.

In terms of successes and challenges, the following points have been highlighted:

Close cooperation between government and civil society – a "whole of society" effort

The broad involvement of different actors in Ukrainian society in pursuing various strategic communication efforts has been described as a key to the success of overall strategic communication work in Ukraine.¹ An example is when government and civil society actors came together and created a national centre for strategic communication, SPRAVDI, which has played an important role in countering Russian information attacks since its founding in 2021.² However, cooperation between government actors and civil society dates back many years before, highlighting the importance of building robust relationships and cooperation models over time.

Combining a top-down and bottom-up approach

Russia's information warfare has from the start been met with strong measures on the part of different Ukrainian actors. For instance, Russian television channels were blocked from broadcasting in Ukraine in 2014. In 2021, the Presidential Administration decided to shut down several Ukrainian TV channels linked to the Kremlin. Taken together, these measures reduced Russia's influence over the country's media sector. The central government, and especially President Zelensky, have also played a key role in the government's strategic communication efforts.

^{1.} Ekman, Ivar, & Nilsson, Per-Erik. Ukraine's Information Front – Strategic Communication during Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). 2023-04-21. https://foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--5451--SE.

^{2.} SPRAVDI. Centre for Strategic Communication, about us. https://spravdi.gov.ua/en/about-us/ (accessed 06/2023).

While this government-driven approach has been widely accepted by the public, the strength of Ukraine's communications effort can also be explained by bottomup actions as well. For example, various online communities routinely use memes and other forms of humour to counter Russia's disinformation³, while social media groups share information online in order to help humanitarian operations or the Ukrainian armed forces at the frontline.

The importance of speed and flexibility

The implementation of strategic communication measures, whereby key narratives from government actors have been shared and then amplified freely throughout many channels within civil society, has been both speedy and flexible. The fact that these narratives have been formulated in an informal tone has helped to further facilitate messaging.

^{3.} Scott, Mark. The shit-posting, Twitter-trolling, dog-deploying social media army taking on Putin one meme at a time. Politico. 2022-08-31. https://www.politico.eu/article/nafo-doge-shiba-russia-putin-ukrainetwitter-trolling-social-media-meme/ (accessed 07/2023).



Achieving a willingness to defend

Unleashing the power of individuals and civil society

The involvement of citizens and voluntary organisations in the Ukrainian defence effort has been crucial. Individuals have contributed based on their abilities and have demonstrated a high level of willingness to defend their country. According to a national poll conducted by the Ukrainian independent organization Sociological Group "Rating" and published in April 2022, more than half of the Ukrainian population had volunteered to support the country's defence efforts in different ways since the start of the full-scale invasion. Fully 35 percent volunteered to help civilians or the military, while 18 percent participated in information resistance. In addition, around 45 percent of the respondents made financial contributions to different organisations involved in the defence of the country. ⁴

Within the Ukrainian rescue services, the number of volunteers has doubled since 2014. Volunteers in general also enjoy the highest level of trust amongst Ukrainian institutions, together with the army and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, according to the annual survey of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, previously low levels of trust in local, regional and national government have increased dramatically, from 15 percent in 2021 to 82 percent in 2022.

In terms of successes and challenges in this area, the following points have been highlighted:

^{4.} Sociological Group "Rating". The Eight National Poll: Ukraine during the war (April 6, 2022). 2022-04-08. https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/vosmoy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina_v_usloviyah-voyny_6_aprelya_2022.html (accessed 07/2023).

^{5.} Op cit, see note 2.

^{6.} Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Dynamics of trust in social institutions during 2020–2021: The results of a telephone survey. 2022-01-26. https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1093&-page=1 (accessed 06/2023).

^{7.} Kagan, Frederick, & Polyak, M. Ukraine's Resilience Transcends the Battlefield. TIME. 2022-10-07. https://time.com/6220447/ukraines-resilience-transcends-the-battlefield/#_ftnref1 (accessed 06/2023).

Building trust in government institutions

The growth of voluntary organisations increased in parallel with an increased trust in local authorities throughout the country. The process of building trust towards government institutions on different political levels was enhanced after the 2014 and 2019 Ukrainian presidential elections and the country's decentralisation reforms in the wake of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 and onwards, which served to increase the quality and availability of municipal services to the population. In the context of the ongoing war, voluntary organisations have played a crucial role in everything from engaging individuals in the protection of vital societal functions to fundraising for the procurement of weapons, uniforms, food, personal protective equipment and to supporting the efforts of soldiers on the frontline.8

Invest in the preparedness of the individual and the role of civil society

The large decentralisation reforms starting in 2014 sparked local and civil society initiatives. With the continued aggression from Russia, Ukrainian authorities increased the focus on strengthening citizens' preparedness in case of emergency or war. Similar to the Swedish pamphlet "If crisis or war comes", Ukrainian government authorities developed in 2020 a handbook providing crucial information for citizens in the event of war.⁹ In addition, investments were also made in training voluntary personnel within the emergency services, while efforts were undertaken to ensure that volunteers and voluntary organisations were more deeply integrated into the country's overarching civil defence organisation.

Show how everybody can contribute


Everyone who is not actively engaged in the Ukrainian military defence has been encouraged to become a volunteer within the country's civil defence structures or to join voluntary organisations involved in different humanitarian causes. This has contributed to further strengthening the public's overall willingness to defend Ukraine.

Local voluntary organisations as key players

Several voices during the events highlighted that local voluntary organisations, with in-depth knowledge about the local area, have been considered to be more efficient in reaching areas close to the frontline than larger, more established humanitarian organisations. Smaller organisations have played and continue to play an important role in complementing the bigger organisations. In order to further lower the barriers for engagement by smaller voluntary organisations, government authorities have focused on creating the necessary conditions for them to contribute more, for example by simplifying the processes for donating vehicles and equipment.

^{8.} Hedenskog, Jakob. How Ukraine Built Its Resilience. SCEEUS Commentary No. 3, 2023. Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies. 2023-02-28. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ sceeus/how-ukraine-built-its-resilience.pdf.

^{9.} DOVIDKA. In case of emergency or war. https://dovidka.info/en/ (accessed 06/2023).



3. Investing in cyber security

From individual awareness to international cooperation

Ukraine has not only shown resilience on the physical battlefield, but also in cyberspace. Oyberattacks have been a large part of Russia's war against Ukraine. For instance, Russia and Russian-affiliated groups have carried out ransomware and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to knock out vital societal functions, to disrupt supply chains, to identify opponents in Russian-occupied territories, and to sow confusion and worry within the Ukrainian population, for instance, by sending out mass text messages. In the last couple of years, such attacks have also had consequences reaching far beyond Ukraine. One example is the Russian attack on the KA-SAT network, which occurred on 24 February 2022, and resulted in disruptions to broadband connections for telecom clients both in Ukraine and around Europe. 11

To counter Russia's cyber-enabled tactics, Ukraine has undertaken a range of measures since 2014, including the development of a cybersecurity strategy and the creation of a Ukrainian "IT army".

In terms of successes and challenges in this area, the following points have been highlighted:

International cooperation is key

Starting in 2014, international cooperation within the cyber domain increased dramatically. In this context, Ukraine received and continues to receive technical systems, financing, expertise, and training from different partners, including the US and UK, the EU, NATO, and the private sector. This has been of vital importance for Ukraine's cyber defence. Nevertheless, there have been challenges in receiving this international support, which has created technical and practical strains on the Ukrainian system. Addressing these has required rigorous joint planning and changes to the country's legal framework. Political engagement from senior officials in Ukraine has been crucial.

^{10.} Bateman, Jon, Beecroft, Nick, & Wilde, Gavin. What the Russian Invasion Reveals About the Future of Cyber Warfare. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2022-12-19. https://carnegie-endowment.org/2022/12/19/what-russian-invasion-reveals-about-future-of-cyber-warfare-pub-88667 (accessed 06/2023).

^{11.} Viasat. KA-SAT Network cyber attack overview. 2022-03-30. https://news.viasat.com/blog/corporate/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-overview (accessed 07/2023).

Create trusted relationships with the private sector

The services provided by private cybersecurity companies have been vital for the cyber defence of Ukraine. The private IT sector in Ukraine has been instrumental in driving the country's digital transformation starting in 2014.¹² Digital applications have, for example, made it easy to continue paying taxes and distributing social payments to citizens, to register for internally displaced person (IDP) status, or to search for temporary accommodation. International companies like Amazon Web Services (AWS) have played an important role in supporting Ukraine by protecting critical data, such as transporting servers from Ukraine to safe locations in other countries and enabling storage capacity through different cloud services in the beginning of the invasion in 2022.

Raise public awareness about cyber-threats

A lesson from Ukraine is the realisation that cyber resilience has to be developed broadly across all segments of society. Each individual, household, and company is potentially a weak link and thus has to be part of any country's overall cyber defence approach. In Ukraine, significant outreach initiatives have been taken, aimed at explaining how individuals can help to mitigate the country's cybersecurity risk exposure in their day-to-day lives online. An example is how a greater awareness about ransomware attacks has reduced the number of citizen's being blackmailed into making payments to criminal groups.

Invest in training with a focus on practical and operational training

In order to build resilience broadly throughout society and especially within the public sector, different countries could dedicate more capacities to training key staff at different levels on cybersecurity. Experiences from Ukraine in particular serve to highlight the importance of practical/operational (rather than theoretical) training.

^{12.} MSB2179. När kriget kom nära: årsrapport it-incidentrapportering 2022. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). 03/2023. https://www.msb.se/sv/publikationer/nar-kriget-kom-nara--arsrapport-it-incidentrapportering-2022/.



Involving the private sector in solving problems

Innovation, adaptation, and flexibility

A recurring feature in explaining Ukrainian resilience in the context of the war concerns the vital role of the private sector. Both Ukrainian and international companies have been able to innovate, adapt, and develop partnerships with the Ukrainian government to meet emerging challenges.

Ukraine has managed to keep the economy going and in some economic sectors there has in fact been notable economic growth. For instance, Ukraine's IT sector grew with 13 percent in 2022, thereby increasing the country's tax base. Meanwhile, thanks to innovate forms of collaboration and flexible management, various telecommunication companies in Ukraine have worked together with the public sector to proactively repair affected systems and maintain telecoms infrastructure operations throughout large parts of the country. Other actors in other sectors have shown equally remarkable resilience. These include, for instance, the country's banks and the national railway operator. At the same time, however, there have been obvious challenges in many sectors, not least the food and agricultural sectors, which have been significantly affected by the systematic mining of agricultural lands and the Russian blockade of Ukraine's ports, essential to the export of grains and other commodities to world markets.

In terms of successes and challenges in this area, the following points have been highlighted:

Flexibility, adaptation, and creative planning

The war has created very different conditions for businesses in different sectors across the country, which have been more or less affected by active fighting, air strikes, and other direct effects of the war. Those companies that have been able to survive have shown a high degree of flexibility when it comes to adapting and/or relocating production and transport routes, but also in finding new markets for their products and services.

Defining a common mission

Resilience in the face of a military invasion starts with the ability of authorities and the private sector to collaborate in efforts aimed at withstanding attacks. Dialogue and non-competitive forms of cooperation are essential elements that inform the models guiding working relations between public and private actors in many different sectors. In order to promote this approach, it has been of key importance for the Ukrainian government to work together with the private sector in defining a common mission for resilience and civil defence. For instance, what are the needs of government agencies that the private sector can help meet in order to maintain security of supply in times of war? Collaboration in this important area started in 2014 and has only deepened in the years since.

Involve the private sector in receiving international help

Ukraine has received substantial donations from the private sector and national governments. Some of these donations have been channelled through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). One challenge in absorbing these donations relates to training, for instance on specific types of equipment being donated. This example illustrates the need for donating organisations and companies to work closely with receiving organisations both at the time of donation and over the longer term, when, for instance, more advanced technical training might be required. Furthermore, the private sector has been able to assist in supporting IDP reception efforts, as well as in providing transportation, logistical resources, and other forms of sometimes quite niche competence.

Need for continued public-private cooperation in promoting Ukraine's future economic recovery and reconstruction

Investments in Ukraine's economy are essential for the country's long-term recovery. In order to confidently make further investments in the Ukrainian economy, private companies benefit from the long-term business strategies developed by Ukraine and supported by partners. As highlighted by representatives from the Swedish government, the integration of Ukraine into the European Union is of vital importance in this respect. Continued efforts are also needed by the Ukrainian government to combat corruption in the country and to develop economic/financial transparency and accountability vis-à-vis international investments and foreign capital provided to Ukraine.



Emergency and rescue services

A valuable asset with a high symbolic value

Ukraine's emergency and rescue services, including the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU), the National Police, and emergency medical organisations, have played a central role in maintaining the resilience of Ukrainian society since 2014. These have also seen their missions expanded in response to specific needs. As an example, SESU has been given responsibility for setting up and running Ukraine's extensive networks of "points of invincibility", i.e., locations in form of safety and humanitarian shelters that are available for the population on a 24/7 basis, where they can receive basic services including electricity, mobile communications, internet, heat, water, and first aid. Another important task for SESU and other emergency services has been to provide essential information to the public to help inform their own decision-making. These and other outreach efforts have taken novel forms, including using humour to convey important messages, as when the Lviv regional administration issued a message to parents through social media, encouraging them to "keep calm, drink coffee, take care of your family, don't be lazy, and believe in victory".

However, the situation for the emergency services has been difficult. Internationally recognised rules of war have not been respected, with the result that Ukrainian emergency and rescue services, non-combatants according to international humanitarian law, have been deliberately targeted. As a consequence, thousands of first responders have been killed, injured, or captured by the Russian armed forces or Russia-affiliated groups. This, the very real risk of being targeted by occupying forces, has led the emergency services to change their own rescue tactics.¹⁴

In terms of successes and challenges in this area, the following points have been highlighted:

Emergency services as a critical "buffer capacity"

In Ukraine, the emergency and rescue services have been involved in many aspects of the country's resilience efforts. They have often been a "buffer capacity" that has had to step in when no one else had clear responsibility. They have also had an important symbolic value in society. By pursuing their mission, significantly expanded by the needs generated by the war, they embody a will to defend which has been a source of inspiration for others.

^{13.} Ukraine's Government Portal. Ministry of Internal Affairs: Points of Invincibility operational now. 2022-11-24. https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/mvs-rozpochali-robotu-punkti-nezlamnosti (accessed 08/2023).

^{14.} Olsén, Mari, Ryghammar, Lotta, & Welander, Frej. Rescue services in times of war: Experiences from Ukraine and lessons learned for Sweden. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). 2023-02-16. https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--5404--SE.

Invest in psychosocial support

Since the further Russian invasion of Ukraine starting in 2022, many first responders live in buildings that the State Emergency Service operate, including local fire stations. This means both that they are away from their families for extended periods of time and need to work extremely long hours, sometimes several days straight without rest. In addition, Ukrainian rescue workers have been constantly exposed to deliberate Russian attacks. This has put a strain on the physical and mental well-being of the work force. There are concerted efforts to enhance the psychosocial support services for rescue workers. An important lesson in this context is to plan for such efforts as part of any civil defence programme.

Constant prioritization to manage parallel events

In Ukraine, the rescue services have been forced to prioritize between different operations. In times of war, these priorities often have to be made without clear guidance from higher command levels. During the war in Ukraine, demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) close to the frontlines have been given priority, followed by operations elsewhere in the country, for example ones aimed at supporting critical infrastructure operations. Understandably, risks not related to the war, such as wildfires or major accidents, have been deprioritised. Having access to tools to support decision-making in situations involving many competing priorities is of great importance.

A modern system for the protection of civilians

During the war, Ukrainians have spent many hours in shelters and "points of invincibility". Many of these locations, including metro stations and building basements, are simply protected spaces, not purpose-built shelters. Given the unpredictability of the war in Ukraine, it has been necessary to develop different forms of flexible shelter solutions, e.g., ones close to bus stations where people inevitably gather and need to shelter close to in the event of an attack. There are many important lessons to be drawn from Ukraine in this respect that would help in, for instance, developing modern, comprehensive systems for the protection of civilians that include, but are not limited to, traditional shelters.

Rescue services in wartime

Commissioned by MSB, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) has studied the wartime experiences of the Ukrainian rescue services with a particular focus on lessons relevant in the context of Sweden's total defence planning.

The full report (in Swedish) can be found here: https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--5404--SE.

MSB has also produced a short video summary of the key findings: https://90sekunderplay.msb.se/.



Culture fosters resilience and unity

Safeguarding cultural heritage and social infrastructure

The war in Ukraine highlights the essential value of culture in times of war. Culture helps to build a will to defend and fosters resilience and unity in a population. By attacking culturally symbolic targets, enemies try to undermine the population's will to defend, to erode social cohesion and to dehumanize the population. The lessons from Ukraine illustrate the importance of being prepared to protect objects of cultural expression and cultural heritage more generally.

Safeguard the cultural heritage

Ukraine has unique museums with extensive collections, as well as palaces, memorial sites and churches showcasing both Ukraine's and the world's cultural heritage. To date, almost 1,600 cases of potential damage to Ukrainian cultural heritage sites have been documented by the Ukraine Conflict Observatory. Collaborative international initiatives have been established to both protect, preserve, and document historical and cultural sites in Ukraine, including monuments and memorials, places of worship, cemeteries, museums, libraries, archives, performing arts centres, historical buildings and archaeological sites. For instance, one initiative has geolocated more than 28,000 such sites in the country.

Safeguard the information domain

Russia has also targeted Ukraine's information domain with a focus on eradicating the Ukrainian language and culture. In order to preserve Ukraine's cultural heritage online, international voluntary efforts have helped the authorities to archive over 5,300 official (government-operated) Ukrainian websites. These voluntary efforts, together with help from large tech companies, help to safeguard the cultural information domain, essential given that today's information is tomorrow's cultural heritage.

^{15.} Ukraine Conflict Observatory. Potential Damage to Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Sites. 2023-03-06. https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/apps/sites/#/home/pages/heritage-1 (accessed 07/2023).

^{16.} Kurin, Richard. How Ukrainians Are Defending Their Cultural Heritage From Russian Destruction. Smithsonian Magazine. 2023-02-22. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/ukrainians-defend-their-cultural-heritage-russian-destruction-180981661/ (accessed 07/2023).

Keep schools running

In Ukraine, two thirds of all children have temporarily had to leave their homes since the start of the full-scale invasion. On average, children have spent more than 900 hours in shelter since February 2022. Schools have been deliberately destroyed by the Russian armed forces or by Russia-affiliated groups and only one in four schools has been able to offer in-class education. Solutions involving online schooling have been developed and have played a very important role in maintaining morale and a sense of normalcy in spite of the war. An important lesson from the war in Ukraine is to plan and prepare for ways for children to go to school, no matter the circumstances.



Appendix

The half-day conference "Forum Ukraine: Building resilience for the future"

On 4 May, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) arranged the forum on lessons from the war in Ukraine together with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). The high-level forum gathered a wide range of representatives of different international organisations, government agencies, civil society organisations and the private sector, as well as ambassadors, politicians, media representatives and Swedish and Ukrainian researchers and policy experts.

The speakers were:

- Olha Stefanishyna, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration
- · Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Swedish Minister for Civil Defence
- Janez Lenarčič, Commissioner for Crisis Management, European Commission
- · Yulia Kazdobina, Head of the Ukrainian Foundation for Security Studies and former advisor to Ukraine's Information Policy Minister on Crimea-related issues (2016-2019)
- · Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and former Chief Advisor to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine
- Ivar Ekman, analyst, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)
- · Hanna Stjärne, CEO, Sveriges Television (SVT)
- Liam Maxwell. Director for Government Transformation. Amazon Web Services
- · Igor Chervak, Country manager for Ukraine, Lantmännen Axa
- Daria Kaleniuk, Executive Director, Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC) in Kyiv
- Hanna Hopko, former chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament (2014-2019) and founder and chair of the board of the National Interests Advocacy Network (ANTS)
- · Dan Sjöblom, Director General, Swedish Post and Telecom Authority
- Jessika Roswall, Swedish Minister for EU Affairs
- Andrius Kubilius, former Prime Minister of Lithuania and Member of the European Parliament
- · Andrii Plakhotniuk, Ukraine's Ambassador to the Kingdom of Sweden
- Torbjörn Becker, Director, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
- · Fredrik Wesslau, Distinguished Policy Fellow at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies and former Deputy Head of the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine

The conference was moderated by Cecilia Malmström, former European Commissioner of Trade and Home Affairs and currently a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) in the United States, MSB's Director-General, Charlotte Petri Gornitzka, and the Director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Jakob Hallgren, provided introductory and closing remarks.

The conference was livestreamed and is available to watch here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=sTa63gehoAs.

