INTRODUCTION

After the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, in the United States it became clear to the world that a new national security paradigm was needed. Gone was the era when a strong military capacity could be the primary resource to defend territorial borders and protect the well-being of a nation’s citizens, property, or critical functions. This was reinforced by the terror bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). More recent events, such as the massive volcanic ash cloud from Iceland (2010) and the earthquake in combination with the tsunami in Japan, displayed our vulnerabilities to disruption and destruction. Furthermore, these events have shown that another significant trend, globalization, has brought an intended, but also unforeseen coupling of systems that has created high levels of interdependence and new vulnerabilities.

Sweden has also had to recover from several dramatic security challenges in recent years. In 2004, over 500 Swedish citizens died in the waves of the tsunami in Southeast Asia. During the suddenly escalating Lebanon conflict of 2006, over 8,000 citizens were hastily, but successfully, evacuated out of harm’s way. Days before Christmas 2010,
the first suicide bomber in the Nordic region, exploded his bomb, luckily prematurely, near a crowded shopping street in the city center of Stockholm. Our neighbor, Norway, experienced a terrible mass murder in July 2011 undertaken by a solo terrorist.

One fundamental element of good governance is the responsibility to be able to manage everyday accidents and emergencies, but also to build the capacity to prevent, manage and recover from complex mega-disasters. So-called “Black Swan” events that are surprising and consequently can be expected to occur in Sweden and in other nations, and in many colors, in the future.¹

**SOCIETAL SECURITY**

The concept of societal security is a pillar of the Swedish approach to the protection of our inhabitants. This is an acknowledgement of the fact that the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century are less about the integrity of territory than about safeguarding the critical functions of society, protecting people, and upholding fundamental values from many types of threats and risks. The threat from an armed attack by a state with the intent to capture and hold territory is very low today in our vicinity. Instead massive loss of life, damage to the socioeconomic system, and impairment of the capacity for rules-based democratic governance can be caused by failing critical societal functions. Societal security suggests an all-hazards approach, as many harmful consequences are similar regardless of whether an event is caused by ill-will, nature, or accident.

In Sweden, the government and the parliament have identified three components to be a baseline of the official objectives for societal security:

- Protect our population
- Maintain our fundamental values
- Secure the functionality of our society

If life and property cannot be safeguarded, then it is not a society where people can live. If a government cannot uphold key values, it will be a society where no one will want to live. Similarly, if a government cannot create and sustain resilient critical functions people will not have confidence in their leaders and in the long run an unstable society will emerge. It is an obligation of good governance to
prepare for the unthinkable and to allocate the necessary resources to minimize the impact on people and on our democratic societies from catastrophic events, such as antagonistic attacks, man-made accidents, or natural disasters.

Societies and all its stakeholders, from individuals to government entities, private corporations, and nongovernmental organizations are challenged by a new and still evolving security context. As a result, Sweden has embarked on a course to create tools that can facilitate a “whole-of-society” approach for societal security. This resembles the strategies of a “whole-of-community” approach being pursued in the U.S. by the Obama administration. This concept indicates a more inclusive approach than the previously advocated “whole-of-government approach” which is too narrow in scope. The effort toward enhancing societal security can only be effective to the extent that partners or stakeholders outside the sphere of government become engaged and contribute. Most importantly, individuals must be mobilized in a more direct manner than was presumed in the whole-of-government approach.

Another building block that underpins the whole-of-society approach is the concept of disaster resilience. The notion of resilience, usually described as a capacity to “withstand” or “bounce back” in the face of a disturbance, can be applied to citizens, organizations, technological systems, and societies as a whole. It includes proactive mitigation, as well as speedy response and recovery, and relies on the ability among a range of interdependent stakeholders to share information and take coordinated action. An element of prevention could also be inferred, as for example terrorists and organized crime could be influenced to choose an alternative target if a nation is perceived to have a high degree of resilience.

The ambiguous concept of resilience is increasingly used by academics and includes several components, such as human, societal, organizational, political, and transnational contexts. A working definition of resilience is:

“Resilience is the capacity of a social system (e.g., an organization, city, or society) to proactively adapt to and recover from disturbances that are perceived within the system to fall outside the range of normal and expected disturbances.”

The rapid rise of the use and popularity among practitioners of the term resilience may be driven by several factors. One driver is
a better understanding of the nature of the security landscape, where uncertainty and complexity are key features. Another driver is shrinking national budgets that make it impossible to allocate huge sums of money to prevent certain scenarios or substantially minimize risk.

Disaster resilience is about shared risks, but also about shared costs. In a situation where governments have to manage a growing spectrum of harmful events with shrinking budgets, the issue of “cost transfer” has become increasingly critical. Doing more with less may be less of a challenge if more stakeholders are contributing to the effort. Ultimately, shared efforts will benefit all stakeholders in society. However, there should also be an element of doing things smarter with fewer resources. In contrast, the alternative of doing less with less offers no viable way forward. One needs to examine and learn from how different nations have handled this dilemma of finding less costly but still effective measures to enhance societal security.

Achieving a whole-of-society approach will require fostering a culture of horizontal coordination and networking across jurisdictional borders. Government reform is the stepchild of crisis. On both sides of the Atlantic, bureaucratic and political stakeholders have decided upon institutional reforms and shifts in strategic thinking concerning the security challenges for the twenty-first century. In the U.S. a whole new policy area emerged after the 9/11 attack, with the centerpiece being the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that became operational in 2003. In the European Union (EU), there are now several organizational entities such as a Home Affairs Commissioner and a counterterrorism coordinator. The most recent EU treaty, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, includes a solidarity clause that requires and necessitates increased cooperation by the twenty-seven member states of the EU in the face of various attacks or disasters. In essence, an EU societal security policy area is being created and cultivated. This evolving field can be seen as a counterpart to the U.S. Homeland Security policy area. It would seem important that these distinct but clearly interrelated enterprises are in harmony.

For the future, it is essential that a strong transatlantic bond is forged in this area of societal security. The threats facing nations in the transatlantic basin in the foreseeable future are mainly nonmilitary and nonterritorial in nature and primarily directed against critical societal functions. The main stakeholders are the U.S., EU and member state entities. NATO has an important role, but it is more supportive in character, since most relevant policy areas and assets are outside its
domain of responsibility. This theme was explored most convincingly by a group of scholars in the 2010 report, Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership. 

THE ENGINE THAT DRIVES THE ENTERPRISE IN SWEDEN

In Sweden there is broad political support for a “whole-of-society” approach on disaster resilience. A key reform was the creation of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in 2009 with the aim of building resilience across sectors and levels of government—reaching from the individual to society as a whole. The new agency replaced the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the National Board of Psychological Defense (SPF). It was the result of Government Bill 2007/08:92 “Stronger emergency preparedness—for safety’s sake.” The goal was to give coordinated support to society in the area of civil contingency management leading to enhanced emergency management capability at home and abroad by harnessing efficiency and effectiveness synergies.

An additional organizational innovation was a new crisis coordination secretariat in the prime minister’s office that serves the needs of the Swedish cabinet offices (comparable to the U.S. White House staff). It was given three main tasks: operating a 24/7 situational awareness center, maintaining a strategic analysis cell, and creating a training and exercise unit for the staff of the ministries.

The trigger for these reforms was the tsunami of late 2004. Although the geographical location was far from Swedish territory, the dramatic loss of over 500 Swedish lives in a matter of hours made clear that future challenges to societal security required a more nimble system. A government commission examined the response and recovery efforts and made recommendations for sweeping reforms. For Sweden, this devastating experience resembled that of the U.S., where reports by the 9/11 Commission noted a failure of imagination and the reports investigating the response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted a failure of initiative.

MSB’s mandate is a concrete expression of a widened policy field for crisis and disaster management, integrating across sectors, across the internal and the external divide, the risks and the threats, as well as the different management phases, before, during and after incidents. MSB is both an engine and a champion to create and facilitate a whole-of-society approach with diverse, and sometimes unevenly motivated, stakeholders.
The Swedish emergency preparedness system is primarily built on the principle of assigned responsibility, which means that whoever is responsible for an activity in normal conditions should maintain that corresponding responsibility during major emergencies. Coordination takes place across sector and jurisdictional boundaries and levels of authority, but MSB will not take over the direct responsibility of primary stakeholders. Coordination among many and diverse stakeholders is a key instrument for MSB to build a common capacity for effective action under the pressures of a diverse set of threats and risks.

The hardest obstacles to overcome for a whole-of-society approach to societal security are conceivably the deeply rooted mental gaps that tend to separate distinct professions with different training and backgrounds. Such gaps complicate close cooperation and smooth coordination, which in turn reduces effectiveness. Gaps in understanding exist between most professional areas, but can be exemplified by the following relationships:

- Between security and safety professionals
- Between civil and military professionals
- Between different civil authorities
- Between public authorities and the private sector
- Between the public domain and volunteer associations
- Between levels of authority
- Among individuals

All of these groups have in common the necessity to cooperate and coordinate before, during, and after an event to achieve the best results for society. Some key factors contributing to these mental gaps are that each category, over time, created their own terminology, ways of organizing, procurements of sector-specific technological solutions, and perhaps most importantly, established idiosyncratic education and training systems that foster sectoral approaches. Thus far, our systems have been better at accommodating interblocking stovepipes than interlocking networks.

In general, a gap exists between safety and security professionals. One difference is the way that these groups work with information. Security officials are used to working with closed information systems to manage classified intelligence material, which they see little
necessity to share outside a trusted few. Safety officials on the other hand are accustomed to using open information and may not even see a need for "intelligence-based" information. With threats becoming more complex, where an event at first can be difficult to define as an apparent "normal" accident or as a terrorist attack, robust cooperation between, for example, police forces and emergency responders needs to be developed well in advance. Emergency responders or local police can also be effective as additional eyes and ears to discover suspicious activities. Another example is to have trusted information systems so that the police and intelligence communities can provide intelligence to the public health community of impending threats in a timely fashion. This would create a better opportunity for health professionals and hospital systems to prepare if there are indications that CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) materials could be used in an attack. As the security environment develops, it is necessary to foster greater understanding between the circles of security and safety professions to ensure the ability to connect the dots in time.  

In many ways, the gap between the civilian and the military sector can be among the easiest to overcome, as awareness is high of the need for closer coordination in planning and in operations in field missions abroad. An example was when MSB dispatched resources in the response phase of the Haiti earthquake using military strategic airlift capacity. The military is also highly standardized from an international perspective when it comes to planning, procurement, and exercises. It perhaps helps that the military has a centralized decision-making hierarchy. The question here is mainly about on whose terms coordination is pursued, as the military machine can overwhelm the more fragmented civilian resources.

Surprisingly civil–civil coordination may be one of the most complex areas. The primary reason is that the roles and responsibilities in the complex civilian sphere are often less clear cut and sometimes even overlapping. As threats and risks evolve, rules and routines may be missing or outdated. Jurisdictional lines can be viewed as complimentary or as competing. Some resistance to being coordinated can be detected, and one reason is probably that interactions for the purpose of modifying behaviors can be highly sensitive among proud professionals.
To foster joint capacity and a common outlook between civilian agencies in Sweden MSB supports six coordination arenas for stakeholder agencies in societal security. Of these six areas, five are thematically organized (see Figure 53-1) and one is territorially based (primarily for regional authorities that work together with the many autonomous municipalities).

These arenas are used to cooperate and collaborate for various purposes, for example, exchanging information on risk and vulnerability assessments and standardization processes, setting science and technology priorities and sharing results, and coordinating exercises and training activities. To support such activities, every year MSB provides these stakeholders with capacity building grants amounting to about 1 billion Swedish crowns ($150 million USD).

Society cannot reach effective security solutions without engaging the private sector through public–private partnerships (PPP). The private sector is crucial, as it operates or owns most of the critical infrastructure in many nations. There was a rich tradition of PPP in Sweden during the Cold War days. At that time, cooperation and coordination were
smooth, as it was mutually understood that if total war would occur through a Soviet invasion there would be no more free enterprise. After that threat was dissolved much was lost in terms of incentives for continuing this close relationship through networking and nurturing trust. Adding to this, business practices and corporate ownerships changed. Today, privatization has gone very far in Sweden, as it has in other free market economies. Most companies have, or are part of, global supply chains that operate with just-in-time deliveries. These practices, however efficient, may not be the most resilient, which was felt by those companies that were dependent on deliveries from Japan after the earthquake and tsunami in 2011.

In Sweden, recent advances in terms of forging trusted relationships with key industry stakeholders have been uneven. In some sectors lost ground has been recaptured and progress has been made, like the well-functioning cooperation between the major players (public and private) in the financial sector, focusing on different aspects of business continuity. There is also a forum for information exchange on the security of critical SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems, which includes key operators of critical infrastructure. Those and other examples constitute “islands of excellence” from which lessons can be drawn. MSB seeks to extend the web of resilience to other sectors.

By creating a trusted environment for information sharing in normal times there is a stronger basis for common action when the extraordinary strikes. But besides trust, PPP requires practical frameworks for cooperation. Roles and responsibilities have to be clarified (joint training can provide a useful tool) and issues like financial (and other) incentives, market distortions, and liabilities have to be addressed. Those are all difficult questions for which there appears to be no universal recipe for success. Sweden is far from alone in struggling with these urgent issues. A useful step would be a more systematic international exchange of best practices.

Sweden has a strong tradition of engaging volunteer associations in security enhancing work. But often the more traditional defense voluntary associations are not totally “in tune” with our new security demands and needs. In Sweden, this tradition of active voluntary organizations involve close to 500,000 people. Many organizations were formed in the early twentieth century and most had a focus on supporting society before and during warlike situations. Many had,
and still have, the task to support the armed forces either directly or indirectly. As the military has broadened its scope of activities to cover national tasks other than confronting armed attacks, as well as supporting civilian authorities in times of extreme emergency situations, so have many voluntary organizations.

MSB supports many voluntary organizations; independent, non-profit associations that recruit and train volunteers for community resilience tasks. As societies grow more diverse due to increasing migration flows, it is important to incorporate organizations representing various religious communities. MSB promotes such dialogues, since these organizations often are influential at the local level and reach many foreign-born individuals in Sweden. Over ten percent of the population is foreign born, and many are youngsters. This requires an understanding of many languages, and insights into various cultures and religions.

There are also mental gaps between the different levels of authority—the local, the regional, the national supra-national (EU), and the international. The principle is that events shall be managed at the lowest level possible, but if one level is overwhelmed, the next level must be ready to step in and support efforts. This principle of subsidiarity is also a guiding element for the relationship between the EU and its member states in the civil protection field. To an extent, it may clash with another EU principle, that of solidarity among the member states and the peoples of the Union. U.S. readers should be quite familiar with the dilemmas of multilevel governance for emergency management.

Making the individual a central component of societal security and resilience is critical. Without individual preparedness it will be quite difficult to achieve a whole-of-society approach with a strong level of disaster resilience. Individuals and families are often the ones affected most directly by a crisis, or are present on-site before first responders or other official representatives. Individuals should be viewed as assets. Furthermore, new social media technologies in the hands of citizens could be utilized by government agencies to receive and transmit information in a more timely manner. Earlier and better information is a driver towards more effective decision making.

In recent years, the government has emphasized the responsibility of the individual to be prepared for crises. MSB’s task and challenge is to analyze what, more precisely, is included in this responsibility.
What services, and how quickly, can individuals expect services from the authorities on a local, regional, or national level to meet their demands before, during, and after a crisis or a major accident? How should cost sharing be balanced among the individuals, insurance providers, infrastructure owners and operators, and tax-funded government bodies at different levels?

MSB has developed several tools and channels to inform individuals about the benefits of being well prepared and conscious of risks and threats in society. Strategies for communication and education are different depending on the target group. MSB has identified two key groups that are particularly exposed and vulnerable: children and the elderly.

School systems provide an arena where MSB can disseminate information on a national level about safety issues. This audience includes not only children, teenagers, and their teachers, but also parents and other relatives. A central strategy of the work with schools is to offer education and training for teachers, aiding them in instilling a safety culture among their students.

Elderly people are another important target group. The elderly are over-represented in the statistics for many types of accidents, mostly at home. Major economic costs are associated with the elderly falling and dying. Because the number of elderly people is expected to increase by more than 25 percent in the coming decade this is a priority group. Extensive cooperation has been established between authorities, such as local health authorities, county councils, county administrative boards, municipalities, and organizations for the elderly.

A highly useful tool that exposes weaknesses and offers a way to achieve a whole-of-society approach is exercises. MSB leads the planning and the execution of exercises as well as the vital evaluation processes. An exercise was conducted in 2011 that involved thousands of participants in different organizations on all societal levels (local, regional, and national). It featured a nuclear accident scenario, which required close coordination and cooperation between many societal stakeholders. The exercise took place just a month before the real situation in Fukushima and sensitized the participants to the inherent challenges faced when confronted by real-world disasters. Increasingly used in these exercises are social media of different types. These are becoming more important to be able to rapidly collect information for situational awareness. Social media are also tools for meaning-making, to explain what the situation is about and what actions the government is taking. The new generation that is taking full advantage of increasingly sophisticated information
technologies needs to be reached. In this recent exercise, the primary decision makers at the national level were overwhelmed by the impact of the pressures from the new media, as one could later witness in the rapidly evolving Japanese disaster.

**TOWARDS AN ALL-HAZARDS PLUS APPROACH**

MSB is involved with the entire spectrum of threats and risks to society—from everyday accidents to major disasters—and at all levels of society. MSB policies concern efforts to address issues before, during, and after the occurrence of accidents, emergencies, and disasters. Although the geo-political environment in the near-abroad is stable and an armed attack by another state against Swedish sovereignty is believed to be improbable, the possibility cannot be ignored in the future. This contingency is therefore included in the planning activities.

MSB provides the government with a nationally aggregated risk and vulnerability assessment. By law, all government entities are obligated since 2006 to produce and submit a risk and vulnerability analysis to MSB. The purpose is to guide investments and for MSB and other relevant departments to make informed decisions about scarce resources to build capacity and provide smart resilience.

A danger would be to equate all-hazards only with saving scarce resources, as the same capabilities can be used for several types of events. It must be recognized that an *all-hazards plus* approach is necessary, as certain antagonistic scenarios demand unique prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. One example would be an event involving weapons of mass destruction, which highlights the need for specialized prevention efforts and stockpiling pre-existing resources for response and recovery efforts. This all-hazards plus approach is different from the counterterrorism plus strategy used in the early years in the homeland security arena in the U.S. The immense investment in counterterrorism measures was then also used for other types of threats, where different solutions may have been more cost-effective. There also needs to be an understanding that all threats cannot be prevented or deterred. Resources need to also be allocated for early warning, response, and recovery efforts. Thus, the emphasis is on resilience in the Swedish approach.

Communicating the value of resilience is an implied acknowledgement that all threats and risks cannot be deterred or prevented. Accidents, disasters, and crises will happen. Establishing a risk-free society is in fact not possible or even desirable. The foundation of a
resilient society is having prepared individuals, families, and communities. Therefore, motivating a private will among individuals to make reasonable investments in self-preparedness is a major public leadership challenge for the future.

Risk analyses are needed and the relationship between risk, threat, and basic societal values needs to be examined. Perceptions and social constructions of risk and threats are important additions to traditional methods of analyzing these phenomena. Methods for constructing national or regional risk maps with clear indications of consequences, including economic and social costs, are being developed. Comparative studies of national methodologies and profiles are needed. The EU Commission has initiated such a process and many governments are in the midst of putting together such risk maps. These need to be problematized and more firmly founded in research.

FLOW SECURITY

A central notion that characterizes the novel environment of the twenty-first century is flow security. Globalization is a force that has transformed how people, corporations, and societies organize and function. Technological developments have been transformational in their development of economies and ways of doing business.

Societies are tightly interconnected by flows of information, energy, computer signals, people and goods. For society to be prosperous, it is important to enable safe, secure, and efficient critical flows. If critical functions, such as transportation, energy, healthcare systems, agriculture, communications, and financial systems are debilitated, it can have consequences for all in society and on several continents simultaneously. This is a message advocated by Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt.

In this age of accelerating globalisation, the true security of our societies, or its citizens, economy and state institutions, is to a very large extent a function of the security of the flows across borders, of the securities of all of those flows of persons, goods, capital, energy, information, whether it be digital or otherwise, that flows across nations, regions and the globe; that is the core of the process of globalisation. To secure all of these flows all the way naturally requires a high degree of collaboration; national security is no longer enough.11
Thus, the traditional goals of ensuring territorial integrity and national sovereignty must be complemented with securing critical functions in society. These are linked by shared transnational or even global interdependencies that must not be transformed into vulnerability traps. Examples are the deliberate denial of critical metals or components, or simply interruptions in access due to various types of disasters.

Globalized flows are not always beneficial and desired. The flow of narcotics, weapons, trafficked persons, cyber intrusions and computer viruses are examples of the dark side of globalization that requires more focused attention. Those working outside the law are more apt to take advantage of these flows than government regulators or political decision makers. Multilateral legal frameworks or regimes are needed to keep up with the rapidly evolving networks of positive and negative flows across national boundaries.

Certain flow enablers are highly critical, such as the maritime shipping lanes and harbors and the air transport system. However, a primary enabler at the center of most globalized transactions is the cyber backbone that involves continental cables and central nodes. The cyber infrastructure links nations, companies, and citizens around the world and helps us channel information and goods more efficiently, but it also generates vulnerabilities. If the global digital infrastructure is ruptured, it will have grave consequences for the financial systems and for the command of critical infrastructure control systems in many industries.

The institutional design of government, however, is slow to adapt to this changing context for security. There is an historical legacy that separates agencies and departments operating in either the domestic or the international sphere. Failing to address jurisdictional, organizational, and even mental barriers to national and international organizational cooperation will be at our peril. Organized crime and terrorists, for example, maneuver in the trans-border sphere, which challenges outdated organizational structures. Exploring new ways to cooperate on planning, information exchange, training, and response is critical for the future. The new security sphere can be characterized by the convergence of the domestic and international (security) arenas. The strategic setting is interdependent, as consequences in one country can have their origins far from that country’s territorial border. The merging of the international and domestic settings into an operational sphere of “intermestics” will require individual and
institutional rethinking to break mental, legal, and organizational stovepipes.

Globalization fueled by rapid technological developments has given rise to trans-boundary threats that may overwhelm our national prevention, protection, response, and recovery systems. These threats cannot be dealt with in a one-by-one manner. Isolation is not a solution for Sweden. A successful response will require a networked approach. In addition, the unconventional and trans-national nature of crises demands a multilateral response. This requires capacity to quickly combine and allocate resources, share expertise, information and disaster logistics, and synchronize crisis decision making. It demands a coordinated approach among international partners across continents. A critical task is being able to quickly and accurately diagnose a rapidly unfolding incident. The processes to achieve such shared sense making under difficult circumstances must begin long before the need becomes imminent.

It is impossible to predict what the next catastrophe will entail. However, we can safely assume that events are likely to provide consequences beyond what we have experienced so far. Some events may not even have a geographically defined impact zone, but can be felt across the globe. In particular, events that affect global arteries, such as the cyber-system, shipping lanes and air transport systems, will display our interdependent vulnerabilities. It is imperative to create tools to overcome the present status of vulnerability surpluses in combination with capacity deficits regarding foreseeing and meeting novel trans-boundary threats.

SWEDEN’S HOLISTIC PHILOSOPHY—A BALANCING ACT

The objective for society is to be able to prevent, respond to, and recover from unexpected high consequence events, thus having a high degree of disaster resilience. To achieve those objectives, three major components and three central values need to be delicately calibrated. The three building components require having a mix of highly trained individuals embedded in flexible organizational structures and drawing upon supportive technical systems. The solution resides in the combinational effects rather than in one or the other of these components. In addition, three central values need to be incorporated and skillfully balanced: security, efficiency and privacy/integrity (see Figure 53-2).
If security is the dominant value that underpins the societal security system it can have side-effects such as wasteful spending. Absolute security cannot be achieved, or will only result in making for an inhospitable society where few would like to live. Efficiency is an important value as it is an integral part of successful economic development. In the long term a nation without economic prosperity and growth will not be able to afford the level of security it desires. A foundation for a democratic society is respect for individual privacy and integrity. Carefully crafted temporary encroachments may be needed at times for security purposes at the expense of privacy and integrity. However, finding the right mix of these fundamental values is highly important in order to provide good economic and societal conditions for economic growth, citizen approval, and security. There is a continuous public debate on this balancing act in Sweden.

**COOPERATION IN THE NORDIC AREA AND IN THE NEAR-ABROAD**

Close cooperation in the area of societal security has existed for decades in the Nordic region, in spite of different role positions during the Cold War. Denmark, Iceland, and Norway belong to NATO, while Finland and Sweden have remained outside any military alliances. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, T. Stoltenberg, was commissioned by his former Nordic colleagues to present a report with recommendations for more intense security collaboration in the

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**Figure 53-2**

A holistic perspective. [Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency]
region. His report was tabled in 2009 and it has generated a number of initiatives in the area of societal security. One such innovation was the 2011 Nordic Solidarity Declaration, which complemented the Solidarity Clause of the EU Lisbon Treaty.

Another recent step was to solidify deeper cooperation through the Nordic Declaration at Haga in 2009. In this political statement, the ministers responsible for societal security agreed to further develop emergency management cooperation within specific areas. It is interesting to note that overall responsibility for societal security falls under three different ministries, Defense (Denmark and Sweden), Justice (Iceland and Norway), and Internal Affairs (Finland). This is an example that it is possible to bridge gaps between different ministries and professional groups and achieve notable results.

Several expert working groups for various concrete tasks were established at the Haga meeting and these are obligated to report annually to the ministers. In 2011, a working group addressing vulnerabilities and prospects for shared operational readiness in the cyber domain was added by the Nordic Foreign Ministers as the first step in making their solidarity pledge more concrete.

Enhanced cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region is also a centerpiece of regional capacity building for societal security. In 2009, an EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region was adopted that has four focus areas, one of them being safety and security. Enhancing maritime surveillance and domain awareness through coupling the many national systems is a priority task. Facilitating closer cooperation of national emergency management systems leading to a more coordinated response in a transboundary disaster is another priority. Furthermore, MSB is involved in a project together with its regional counterparts (including EMERCOM of Russia) within the framework of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) to develop a regional risk assessment that can inform future planning for societal security. Within the purview of an agreement on cooperation on emergency prevention, preparedness, and response large-scale exercises are held between Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia in the Barents Region every other year.

The Arctic region is an area of increasing strategic importance as climate change over time will allow for new and increased activities, such as tourism (especially cruise ships), economic activity (fishing, transport routes, and oil and mineral exploration), and military movements. The Arctic Council that Sweden chairs until 2013, signed in 2011 its first binding agreement on “Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in the Arctic.” This vast region
around the North Pole is set to experience increasing trans-boundary activity, making common capacity building important. An agreement on mutual assistance in the case of oil spills in the Arctic will most likely be concluded in the near future. Also the U.S., Canada, and Russia are important participants in these multilateral arrangements.

DEVELOPING THE COMMON EU CAPACITY

The reality of trans-boundary risks is increasingly pushing European member states to deepen their cooperation and tighten the web of resilience across the Union. The internal market allows people, goods, and information to travel rapidly across national borders. Since the end of the 1980s, large sums have been invested in establishing so called Trans-European Networks for transport, energy, and telecommunications, which provide effective linkages between the EU’s 500 million inhabitants. The recent economic crisis is also pushing member states towards closer financial integration.

As the chains of interdependence grow increasingly strong across the European homeland, there has been a renewed focus on the need for joint risk and threat assessment, as well as more developed instruments for “pooling and sharing” in crises and disasters. In 2009, during the Swedish Presidency of the EU, the Stockholm Program was presented, defining the common agenda for justice and home affairs over the next five years. An important component in this new work program was the call for a European Internal Security Strategy (ISS) and an action plan which would help define the area of European internal (societal) security and identify strategic priorities for the future. One of the key actions was the development by 2014 of “a coherent risk management policy, linking threat and risk assessments to decision making.”

In response to this, EU member states are currently involved in a joint effort to develop risk assessments at a national level, which will feed into a broad overview of major risks at a European level. Sweden has provided the Commission with a first report, identifying 24 different risks, some of which are considered serious enough to entail a possible need for European or international assistance.

EU capacity for managing risks and crises has been considerably boosted over the past few years, but is still marked by a lack of overall coherence. Within the Commission and among EU agencies there are currently a number of sector crisis centers and early warning systems focused inter alia on civil protection, health threats (pandemics, CBRN), nuclear security, food safety, migration, and critical infrastructure.
protection. With the new EU Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the External Action Service (EEAS), additional bodies for crisis response and EU coordination have emerged, increasing the possibilities for duplication and unclear divisions of responsibility.

One of the most advanced of these EU crisis centers, the so called European Response Center (ERC), is currently hosted by the Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, Kristalina Georgieva. The ERC provides risk monitoring, training, and coordination of member states’ resources across a wide risk spectrum, covering both EU-internal and external crises. In order to allow for a swift response, member states have agreed to organize their response capacities in pre-defined modules which are placed in a common pool. Since 2009, there has also been an increasing focus on the development of policies for disaster prevention and resilience within member states and non-EU countries.

Despite the raised ambitions for EU cooperation in risk and crisis management there is still untapped potential. The squeezing of national budgets will, over time, require more developed positions and policies on the pooling of resources. The concept of solidarity, which appears in a number of different sections of the Lisbon Treaty, may need to be more sharply defined to match future challenges such as the consequences of climate change and the growing cost of disasters. Article 222 (the Solidarity Clause) in the EU treaty states, in no uncertain terms, the political will to move towards closer integration of policies and instruments for cross-border cooperation and security in the EU:

The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

- prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.\textsuperscript{18}
So far EU member states have not revealed any lack of political will to support each other “in a spirit of solidarity” in situations of need. There are, however, still a number of hurdles of a practical, legal, or administrative nature that make cross-border assistance complicated in the EU and even more so in a Euro-Atlantic context. Some of those hurdles became apparent in the management of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. One of the more useful tools to pinpoint obstacles for international assistance is exercises. The topic of assistance across the Atlantic was recently explored at the National Level Exercise (NLE) 2011 in the U.S., but more narrowly focused and smaller exercises to identify problems and discuss constructive ways forward are needed.

EURO-ATLANTIC COOPERATION

The Euro-Atlantic strategic setting of entangled interdependencies, where critical functions and nodes rely on the actions of others, creates a necessity for a well functioning U.S. and EU partnership. Future trans-boundary crisis management in the transatlantic domain should not risk becoming “a failure of coordination.” It is imperative to secure in advance an ability to act effectively and legitimately in concert within this new policy domain of the transatlantic partnership.

Although it is not necessary for the same institutional and strategic concept to be embraced on both sides of the Atlantic, it is important that efforts are, at a minimum, mutually reinforcing and not inter-blocking. It is also necessary to view homeland security, or societal security, as an activity rather than as the policy domain of a specific department, ministry, agency, or directorate.

While much has been achieved to put institutions and policies in place to make our domestic societies more safe and secure and to enhance the capacity for alleviating complex emergencies in distant places, we must not neglect to address our shared transatlantic space. “The responsibility to protect” has been established as a guiding principle for engagement by governments on behalf of suffering populations in non-EU countries. By the same logic, the governments around the Euro-Atlantic basin have a shared responsibility to protect their populations and their open democracies and economies. This is a core element of good governance, and something expected from the leaders of these nations by the voters. A Europe and North America, “whole and free” but suffering from societal vulnerability surpluses, would not be in line with the governing principle of the responsibility to protect.
As Dr. Cecilia Malmström, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs and a former member of the Swedish Cabinet, has stated, the transatlantic community is in this enterprise together.

Besides addressing global security we need to focus much more on cooperation on internal security. An attack on Baltimore is as much an attack on Berlin or Brussels. Our societies are so open and interlinked that no matter if an attack occurs in Europe or the U.S. we are both paying the price. So only by working together will we be able to counter terrorism. Only by working together will we be able to fight the cyber threat.¹⁹

The nature and origins of U.S. and EU developments within this complex and emerging policy area can be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Homeland Security</th>
<th>EU Societal Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instant reaction to 9/11</td>
<td>Gradual developments over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism was the impetus, but now an all-hazards approach</td>
<td>From looking to the East (Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact) to an all-hazards approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear decision in 2002 to create Department of Homeland Security (operational 2003)</td>
<td>No formal decision (but irreversible step by step)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational focus</td>
<td>Network-based cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ample resources available</td>
<td>Fragmented resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic focus, but increasingly international outlook</td>
<td>National focus, but an expanding multilevel and multisector EU approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A vitalized and more coherent partnership in societal/homeland security needs to be forged between the EU institutions, the member states, and the U.S. A natural arena to establish and legitimize a new and critically important dimension of the partnership for a secure transatlantic community is the regular EU–U.S. summits. More concrete activities with joint working groups and task forces could be created to give these summits more of an analytical and cumulative underpinning. Considering the importance of enhancing the security of our own societies, it would be timely to launch an EU–U.S. Transatlantic Cooperative Security Working Group or Task Force to advance the discussion on societal security across all sectors.
Some important pioneering efforts exist in specialized sectors, such as in science and technology, cybersecurity, and civil protection. In addition to specialized transatlantic working groups, some of these cooperative arrangements are also regulated in Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) or similar legal foundations. There are biannual high-level meetings between the EU and the U.S. in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, where, for example, DHS Secretary Napolitano meets with EU counterparts such as Commissioner Malmström and Commissioner Reading (EU Vice President and Commissioner for Justice). However, these meetings usually deal with the immediate and near-term affairs. At the 2010 EU–U.S. Summit, an EU–U.S. Working Group on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime was formed to discuss issues such as cyber incident management, public–private partnerships, awareness raising, and combating cybercrime. An EU–U.S. cybersecurity table-top exercise, Cyber Atlantic, was organized in November 2011 with the aim to strengthen collaboration in the area of incident management and response.

Some DHS and EU agencies have signed formal agreements to cooperate within their silos of excellence. In 2009 DHS, for example, signed a Cooperative Work Arrangement with FRONTEX, the EU’s border management agency, to share best practices on integrated border management, information sharing, risk analysis, training, and research and development. The EU Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) signed an administrative arrangement with the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency in November 2011 to create a framework for sharing information in areas such as risk assessments, lessons learned, and exercises. In 2010, the EU Commission and the Directorate for Science and Technology at DHS signed an implementing arrangement to cooperate in the field of homeland/civil security research. This can facilitate academic networks across the Atlantic that are competitive in funding opportunities within the EU’s next Framework Program “Horizon 2020” and the DHS grant awarding process.

All these examples of activities, working groups, and signed agreements are valuable, but insufficient if long-term and emerging vulnerabilities are to be addressed together. The suggested EU–U.S. Transatlantic Cooperative Security Working Group or Task Force, comprised of strategic policy planners, would serve as a cross-sector forum for strategic deliberations about threats, vulnerabilities, and response and recovery capacities that cut across sectors and borders.
It would complement existing professional work within established but stovepiped fora. It would provide the needed holistic and strategic perspective on what sectors and areas are working smoothly and where more attention is needed.

This is a relatively immature policy area lacking a developed professional corps to manage such a wide field of cross-sector and multilevel issues. Flow security is a shared concern that cuts across many sectors and stakeholder interests. Novel tools to meet these challenges need to be developed together and with a holistic perspective. How can a shared approach allow effective use of assets, as well as balancing core values such as privacy and civil liberties?

To further foster a shared understanding of the challenges and opportunities for cooperation, a common strategic executive training curriculum could be developed for senior leaders’ transatlantic workshops in the societal security area. Education and training to cope with the unexpected and consequential is obligatory for advancements in the military sphere, why not for leaders in public service and business executives? Various NATO training programs have considerable experience and could inspire similar investments in strategic leadership for an all-hazards approach to security.

The task for an EU–U.S. Transatlantic Cooperative Security Work Group or Task Force would be to turn our shared values and preferences regarding security into action plans. Concepts have to be operationalized and transformed into concrete activities with deadlines and measurable effects. Academics and think tanks should be well placed to contribute ideas and expertise to such work. The time is overdue to turn the homeland security and societal security continental enterprises into interlocking work packages that transcend the Euro-Atlantic space.

NOTES


4. Ibid. p.9.
7. With a population of 9 million, over 500 deaths would be comparable to a loss of 15000 lives in a few hours in the U.S.